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Introduction
A long research tradition in sociology and
social psychology has shown that social net-
works play an important mediating role in
the diffusion of behaviors and opinions
through a society. In many different contexts,
people are influenced by those with whom
they interact (Erickson, 1988; Marsden &
Friedkin, 1993; Merton, 1968). Empirical
examples of such processes include peer pres-
sure among adolescents (Davies & Kandel,
1981), diffusion of innovations (Coleman,
Katz & Menzel, 1957; Valente, 2005), rebel-
lion, and collective action (Gould, 1991,
1993; Opp & Gern, 1993). These findings
are relevant for the study of polarization,
described as the social or ideological separa-
tion of a society into two or more groups (see
also Esteban & Schneider, 2008), because the
adaptation process might increase agreement
within groups, while it deepens disagreement
between groups. The extent to which a society
will polarize into possibly opposing camps is
likely to be influenced by the patterns of
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1 See also Stokman & Zeggelink (1996) for a model in
which opinions and networks are adapted simultaneously.
social relations through which members of
the society influence each other, and through
which opinions, behaviors, and ideologies
diffuse.
It is important to realize that social net-
works are not always static but can be altered
by actors consciously selecting their relations.
At least in part, this selection process is based
on behavioral traits of others; sociological
research shows that people tend to choose their
friends among those who behave and think in
a similar way to themselves (a process known
as ‘homophily’; see Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954;
McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001;
Zeggelink, Stokman & van de Bunt, 1996).
The combination of network influence and
selective network-formation processes implies
that, first, polarization may occur because
behavior or opinions cluster locally within net-
works and, second, a society may segregate
socially because people with different behav-
iors or opinions tend to avoid each other.
Our study of polarization takes into account
that social and ideological alienation and
behavioral alienation between groups develop
interdependently. In other words, the degree to
which polarization on a behavioral trait occurs
depends on patterns of social ties, but this
social structure itself is also influenced by
behavioral choices. We aim at a theoretical
understanding of the interplay between polar-
ization of behavior and social structure. We
develop a model in which actors are involved
in interactions with others with whom they
have social relations, while this social network
is itself subject to change by the actors. This
model predicts how the likelihood of polar-
ization of behavioral outcomes depends on
the social structure of a society at the time that
actors have to decide on a certain form of col-
lective action or have to develop an opinion
on some issue that becomes salient. In addi-
tion to problems in which persistent disagree-
ment constitutes a clear potential for conflict,
the model captures other types of processes
from which conventions emerge, such as
lifestyle choices of pupils in school classes. In
such networks, persistent disagreement is not
problematic per se.
Polarization, Conflict and Coordination
Group mobilization and group formation 
have previously been modeled in different
ways, for example, as social influence processes
(Axelrod, 1997),1 as multiperson Prisoner’s
Dilemmas (Takács, 2001), or as collective
action problems (Gould, 1999). Identification
with a group can also be considered a multi-
person coordination problem, in the sense that
belonging to a group and making the same
choice as others are more important than what
choice is actually made (Hardin, 1995). In
group identification, one prefers to join a
group if others do the same, because benefits
can be expected from group membership itself.
There is little sense in speaking English if
everyone else speaks French; similarly, it may
not be beneficial to identify as Serbian if every-
one else identifies as Yugoslavian. However, if
enough people start to call themselves Serbs, it
becomes attractive to join this group.
It can be argued that not only identifica-
tion with a group, but also group action are
mainly matters of coordination. Usually,
group mobilization and other forms of
collective action are seen as free-rider prob-
lems. According to the ‘logic of collective
action’ (Olson, 1971), individual group
members should not be expected to con-
tribute to collective efforts unless they have
individual (selective) incentives that com-
pensate their efforts. Hence, collective action
should not occur in most cases because every
individual has reasons to free-ride on the
other group members. This prediction seems
at odds with the real-world observation that
group action does occur in many instances,
from voting to mass demonstrations and col-
lective violence. This led some scholars to
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argue that coordination rather than cooper-
ation is the basic strategic interaction that
underlies group action. According to Hardin
(1995), the power resulting from mass action
can diminish the costs of joining to a level
that is sufficiently low to reduce the free-rider
problem to a problem of coordination (see
Heckathorn, 1996; Macy, 1991; Marwell &
Oliver, 1993). Others (Chwe, 2001; Gould,
1995; Klandermans, 1988; Lohmann, 1994)
have also pointed at the importance of coor-
dination in collective phenomena such as
rebellion, uprisings, and union participation.
Therefore, by modeling collective action as a
coordination problem, we abstract from free-
riding problems and focus on settings in
which actors have an incentive to join if
enough others do so as well.
Modeling group identification and group
mobilization as a coordination problem is not
to say that actors are indifferent between behav-
ioral alternatives as long as they coordinate with
others. The coordination game that is the back-
bone of our model accommodates for ranking
of behavioral alternatives, while coordination
with others still has priority. Consider the
simple coordination game as displayed in
Figure 1, with c8. This game has two Nash-
equilibria, (X, X) and (Y, Y), in each of which
actors do not wish to deviate as long as the
other actor does not deviate. However, (Y, Y)
yields higher payoffs for both actors and is
termed efficient or payoff-dominant. The other
equilibrium (X, X ) is attractive in the sense that
it is less risky: if an actor assumes that the other
actor chooses X and Y with equal probabilities,
the expected payoff of choosing X is higher
than that of choosing Y. Therefore, (X, X ) is
risk-dominant (Harsanyi & Selten, 1988). For
our applications, choosing Y may represent
joining an uprising in order to accomplish a
regime change, while choosing X is to stick to
the status quo. Joining the uprising is risky if
you are not sure that others will also do so.
A consequence of choosing a multiperson
version of the coordination game as described
above implies that we can provide predic-
tions not only on the likelihood and extent
of polarization, but also on the extent to
which actors coordinate on the efficient
equilibrium. However, the model does not
predict how the likelihood of the emergence
of violent conflict depends on the polariza-
tion that might arise in a population. Rather,
the theory assumes that polarization into
separated but internally coordinated groups
provides potential for violent group conflict,
while the model specifies the conditions
under which a polarized situation is more or
less likely to occur.
As a measure of polarization, we use the
two-group version of the index for qualita-
tive variation IQV (Mueller & Schuessler,
1961: 177–179; see also Agresti & Agresti,
1978), which is defined as 4 p(Y )(1p(Y )),
where p(Y ) is the proportion of actors in the
population choosing Y. The measure implies
that polarization is 0 if p(Y )0 or p(Y )1,
while it equals its maximal value 1 for
p(Y )0.5. This measure is the standardized
version of a much older version of a diversity
measure that dates back to Gini (see Lieberson,
1969, for an overview). We focus on polar-
ization as defined above because, with only two
groups, we cannot distinguish it from, for
instance, fractionalization (see Montalvo &
Reynal-Querol, 2005; Reynal-Querol, 2002).
The maximum of our polarization measure
is reached if both groups are of equal size,
which corresponds with the maximum for
conflict potential according to Esteban &
Ray (1999) for the general polarization
measure (Esteban & Ray, 1994; see also
Esteban & Schneider, 2008).
Coordination and Social Networks
Earlier theoretical studies of coordination in
large groups consider models in which actors
interact with all other actors in the popula-
tion, without assuming any social structure
(e.g. Kandori, Mailath & Rob, 1993; Young,
1993). However, this assumption seems highly
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unrealistic for many applications. Actors 
can often observe the behavior only of those
with whom they interact directly; they ob-
serve only their own personal network. This
is especially true for cases in which no public
information is available about the distribu-
tion of behavior in the larger population, and
so actors really have to rely on their close
surroundings for information. They may
even use the behavior of the members of
their personal network as an approximation
of the behavior in the larger population. 
Opp & Gern (1993) and Lohmann (1994), for
example, discuss the importance of personal
networks for the ‘Monday Demonstrations’
in Leipzig, 1989, which is a typical case 
in which public information was highly
restricted. Gould (1991, 1993, 1995), Scott
(1990), Hardin (1995), and Chwe (2001)
similarly emphasize the role of networks in
instances of (violent) collective action.
Theoretical models dealing with local
interaction have been formulated by (among
others) Ellison (1993), Young (1998), and
Berninghaus, Ehrhart & Keser (2002), al-
though these authors do not consider the pos-
sible heterogeneity of the network structure.
Buskens & Snijders (2005) explicitly deal with
coordination in heterogeneous social network
structures, where heterogeneity refers to actors
having different positions in the network, that
is, they do not necessarily have the same
number of relations. Considering static net-
works only, Buskens & Snijders (2005) show
that denser and less segmented networks reach
consensus more easily than less dense and more
segmented networks. In addition, segmenta-
tion leads to more actors choosing the risky
option, while density results in fewer actors
choosing the risky option. Thus, segmentation
renders less efficiency in the emerging behav-
ior, while density has the opposite effect.
However, networks are created by people
and change over time (Flap, 2004). Therefore,
we consider a model in which actors are orga-
nized in a dynamic social network, obtaining
‘high’ payoffs for relations with actors who
behave in the same way and ‘low’ payoffs for
relations with actors who behave differently.
Assuming that maintaining social relations is
costly, relations have to be chosen cautiously,
which implies that relations with actors who
behave differently may be terminated.
Recently, the study of dynamic networks
with strategic decisionmaking of actors in 
the network has developed quickly (for 
an overview, see Dutta & Jackson, 2003;
Newman, Barabási & Watts, 2006). Specific
models for coordination games played on
dynamic networks are studied by Skyrms &
Pemantle (2000), Jackson & Watts (2002),
Goyal & Vega-Redondo (2005), and
Berninghaus & Vogt (2006). These models
focus on which networks are stable and on
how behavior is distributed in stable net-
works. Typically, many configurations are pos-
sible. Therefore, we take a different approach
and focus on how preconditions determine
the emergence of a stable network and the














Figure 1. Two-Person Version of the Multiperson Coordination Game with Payoffs as in the Simulation
(bc a d; in the Simulation c4 or 8)
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2 In terms of the two-person game, this would be the con-
dition that (Y, Y ) is not only the payoff-dominant equilib-
rium, but also the risk-dominant equilibrium (in the sense
of Harsanyi & Selten, 1988).
We study two variants. The first variant
assumes that (ab)(dc), so that choos-
ing Y not only can lead to the efficient payoff
d, but also is less risky, because the expected
payoff from playing Y is relatively high if you
do not know what others will do.2 The
second variant assumes (ab)(dc), so
that choosing Y is the risky choice because the
expected payoff from playing Y is relatively
low if you do not know what others will do.
The actual payoffs that we use in the simula-
tion are indicated in Figure 1. Buskens &
Snijders (2005) demonstrate that RISK
(ab)/(abcd ), in combination with
the behaviors of the actors with whom a focal
actor is connected, determines whether or not
this focal actor wants to change behavior. In
addition, Buskens & Snijders (2005) show
that network effects are small for static net-
works if RISK values are far from 0.5, but that
there are major differences in network effects
depending on whether RISK is just above or
just below 0.5. Therefore, in the simulation,
RISK varies between 0.467 and 0.538.
In addition, we assume that ties are costly.
We abstract from separate costs for the cre-
ation or the deletion of ties. Thus, the costs
of existing ties have to be paid in every period
of interaction, but ties can be deleted without
any cost. We assume increasing marginal tie
costs, and so the more ties one has, the more
‘effort’ is required for another tie. Increasing
marginal tie costs can also be interpreted as
diminishing marginal returns of relation-
ships; an equivalent model assumes constant
tie costs and benefits that decrease with an
actor’s number of interactions. The total
costs for an actor of having t ties are k(t)
tt2, where 0 and 0. If 0,
the tie costs are linear in the number of ties,
and there are no increasing marginal costs 
of having more ties. Otherwise, there is a
study the extent to which polarization in seg-
regated groups emerges and inefficient behav-
ior persists as a result of the initial network
and the initial distribution of behavior. More
specifically, we aim to answer the following
research question: How do the polarization and
efficiency of the emerging distribution of behav-
ior depend on the initial distribution of behav-
ior, the initial network, the tie costs, and the
payoffs in the coordination games?
In the next section, we present the
dynamic model and analytic results on stable
states. Subsequently, we describe simulations
and derive predictions on the effects of initial
conditions on polarization and efficiency. In
the final section, we conclude and interpret
the results in terms of the probability that
conflicts may emerge.
The Model
Actors are organized in a network of n actors
with the n	n adjacency matrix N (nij),
that is, nij1 if two actors are connected and
nij0 otherwise. We assume that relation-
ships are undirected, so nijnji. Relationships
have both benefits and costs. Actors have to
choose between two types of behavior (or
opinions, attitudes), and their benefits or
payoffs depend on their own behavior and
the behaviors of the actors with whom they
have relationships. They cannot differentiate
their behavior depending on specific rela-
tionships. In every existing relationship, the
payoff is related to the actor’s own behavior
and the behavior of the other person in cor-
respondence with the coordination game
depicted in Figure 1. From actors with whom
actor i does not have a relationship, i obtains
a payoff 0. In our multiperson coordination
game, this implies that the payoff of an actor
i choosing X equals where
j(Z ) runs over other actors who choose Z,














i jn a n c,( ) ( )
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maximum number of network ties one can
maintain, given the payoffs one can obtain
related to relationships. In one period of
interactions, the total payoff of an actor
equals where pij is the
payoff i receives as a result of his own and j’s
behavior and is the number of 
ties of actor i.3 Finally, we define how the
network is changed. Actors can add and sever
ties. Because of their undirected nature, ties
can be created only with the consent of both
partners, but can be removed unilaterally. In
other words, we assume a two-sided link-
formation process (Jackson & Wolinsky,
1996). We also assume that actors have full
information on the behavior of all actors in the
network.
Stable States
In line with related works (Berninghaus &
Vogt, 2006; Goyal & Vega-Redondo, 2005;
Jackson & Watts, 2002), we search for stable
networks first, that is, networks in which
• no actor wants to change behavior,
• no actor wants to sever a tie, and
• no pair of actors wants to add a tie given
the actors’ behavior in the network.
This corresponds to pairwise stability (Jackson
& Wolinsky, 1996) in networks in which
only ties can be changed. The condition on
behavior is added to guarantee stability in
terms of the behavior chosen by the actors.
In order to characterize stable networks, two
definitions are helpful.
Definition A (sub)network is t-full if and
only if no actor has more than t ties and






( )n p k ni j i j i ,
either the addition of a tie causes that at least
one of the actors has more than t ties or no
ties can be added to the (sub)network.
Definition For ZX, Y, t¯z is the maximum
number of ties an actor wants to have if he
chooses Z and all actors with whom he has a
relation choose Z as well.
These definitions are useful because the
number of relations an actor wants to main-
tain is determined by the tie costs and the
payoffs an actor can obtain. More specifi-
cally, a new relation with someone with
whom an actor i can earn pij is started only
if the number of ties actor i has will be less
than or equal to (pij)/2 after adding
this new relation. Otherwise, the marginal
costs of adding this new tie are larger than its
benefits. This implies that
Theorem If tie costs are equal to k(t)t
t2 (b and 0), networks are stable if
and only if one of these conditions holds:
(1) All actors choose the same behavior Z,
where ZX, Y, and the network is t¯z-full.
(2) The network consists of two subgroups
of actors choosing X and Y and these
subgroups are t¯X-full and t¯Y -full, respec-
tively, and there are no ties between the
two subgroups.
Proof As tie costs are always larger than b,
a tie between actors with different behavior
is never sustainable, because one of the actors
wants to sever the tie or change behavior. It
is easily checked that the definition of t¯z-full
implies that no pair of actors wants to add a
tie and no actor wants to sever a tie. Because
tX 













3 Although our cost function is provided in a very explicit
form, the only crucial aspect is the number of ties an actor
wants to have depending on whether he obtains mostly a
or d in his relations. The possible number of ties is varied
in the simulation over the complete relevant range.
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actors are not connected with actors who
behave differently, they do not want to
change behavior. All other networks are
unstable, because in (sub)networks that are
neither ¯tY-full nor ¯tX-full, some actors want to
remove or add ties. This completes the proof.
The theorem is a reformulation of the
corresponding theorem in Berninghaus &
Vogt (2006) for costs that are non-linear in
the number of ties and for the conditions we
want to consider. We extend the results of
Berninghaus & Vogt, not only by allowing
for non-linear costs but also by studying the
likelihood of the emergence of different
structures depending on initial conditions;
see the simulation section below. Jackson &
Watts (2002) study coordination and endoge-
nous formation of networks. They analyze
which networks are stochastically stable in a
specific dynamic context, showing analyti-
cally that homogeneous networks emerge in
which all the actors coordinate on one
behavior (cf. Young, 1998). Which behavior
is chosen depends on the tie costs. In their
analysis, conflict situations are excluded as
possible long-term outcomes, because they
are less stable than non-conflict situations. In
contrast with their study, we do not include
‘trembles’, but analyze how the likelihood of
emerging structures in a deterministic
dynamic environment depends on initial
conditions. In a deterministic environment,
networks with polarized behavior can be
stable. This makes it possible to address the
likelihood of conflict. Goyal & Vega-Redondo
(2005) analyze a similar model but assume a
one-sided link-formation cost. More import-
antly, they characterize only stable states
without analyzing the likelihood that certain
stable networks emerge.
The condition in the theorem that
(sub)networks should be t¯X-full or t¯Y -full
suggests that the payoff and cost structure
does not allow much variation in network
structure. This is true in the sense that the
density (proportion of ties present in the
network) of the emerging network hardly
varies with the cost function, the payoffs,
and the distribution of behavior in the
emerging network. Some variation is still
possible. Let us consider as an example a
nine-actor network in which everybody
wants to have two ties. If behavior is homo-
geneous, both three closed triads and one
circle of nine actors are stable networks.
Another type of variation is related to the
possibility that one actor may still have fewer
ties than he wants to have but all other actors
in his group have their maximum number of
ties (compare Jackson & Watts, 2002: 182,
for more details on variations in network
structures). The simulation results presented
below indeed confirm that the density of the
emerging network is almost perfectly deter-
mined by the emerging distribution of
behavior, the payoffs in the game, and the tie
costs. Other network measures turn out to be
hard to predict from the initial network struc-
ture. Therefore, the analyses below focus on
predicting how the emerging distribution of
behavior depends on initial conditions.
Simulation Design
To analyze the effects of the model parame-
ters on the emergence of stable networks by
means of computer simulation, we systemat-
ically vary the initial conditions of the
dynamic process and relate the outcomes of
the process to these conditions. The condi-
tions include the initial network, the initial
distribution of behavior, the payoff structure
of the coordination game, the tie costs, and
the adaptation rules in the dynamic process.
Network size ranges from 2 to 50 actors. For
networks of 2 to 8 actors, we include all
13,597 possible non-isomorphic networks.
For networks of size 9 to 50, the number of
possible networks becomes extremely large,
and we take a sample stratified on the size
(number of actors) and density of the network.
In other words, we draw a set of random
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networks, while density and size are fixed
such that for each size there are about the
same number of networks. Also, for each
density within each size, a similar number of
networks are drawn. Extreme densities for
which the number of non-isomorphic net-
works is small are excluded. This results in a
set of 95,729 networks. The probability of
each actor initially choosing ‘Y ’ equals 0.25,
0.50, or 0.75. This results in a wide range of
distributions of actual initial behavior.4 For
reasons mentioned above, we vary only
payoff c (see Figure 1) such that RISK takes
the values 0.467 (c4) and 0.538 (c8),
fixing the other payoffs at b0, a14, and
d20. With regard to the tie costs, we vary
both the linear and quadratic components
such that all 0t¯Xt¯Yn1 are possible.
Linear cost  is chosen as an integer number
from 1 through 16 (excluding c, and 14 to
avoid equalities with payoffs), each with an
equal probability. For 14,  is chosen
such that all values of t¯X (0t¯Xn1) are
equally likely by choosing (14)/
(1r (n1)) where rU[0,2]. If 14, we
have t¯X0. In these situations,  is chosen
such that all values of t¯Y (0t¯Yn1) are
equally likely by choosing (20)/
(1r (n1)) and again rU[0, 2].
The dynamic model assumes discrete
time. All actors simultaneously choose
behavior in each period. We distinguish three
methods for how actors change behavior and
ties between periods. All methods assume
actors to be myopic, that is, optimizing
under the restriction that the behavior and
network of the previous period persists. It is
also assumed that all actors know the
behavior of all other actors.5 The three
methods are different in the relative adjust-
ment rates of behavior and ties. Since these
adjustment rates can be expected to affect
outcomes (Skyrms & Pemantle, 2000), we
compare three approaches:
(1) ‘Actor-based’: Actors decide themselves
which type of change they prefer. After
every period, a random actor is allowed
to change either behavior or one network
tie, whatever is most beneficial. We
assume the actor will choose the alterna-
tive with the highest payoff to him,
given the network and behavior of other
actors in the preceding period. If multi-
ple tie changes yield the same maximal
benefit, one is selected at random.
(2) ‘Alternating’: After every period, the
actors in a random dyad decide whether
they want to add or remove a tie between
them. In addition, one random actor
decides whether or not he wants to change
behavior. This mechanism is similar to the
one applied by Jackson & Watts (2002).
(3) ‘Fast network’: Now the network is
allowed to change relatively fast com-
pared to behavior. In comparison to the
‘alternating’ version, not one but [n/2]
dyads are considered to change their tie
after every period, and, next, one random
actor is allowed to change behavior.
In any of the three methods, actors are
informed about previous changes before they
have to decide. If actors are indifferent
between a change and the existing situation,
we assume that actors do not change. We also
postulate that actors do not change ties if
4 Using this procedure, we obtain satisfactory amounts of
variation in the variables that we want to use as indepen-
dent variables to explain polarization and efficiency.
Selectivity on the independent variables should, in princi-
ple, not affect the estimations of the regression models we
use below. Nevertheless, we did some checks to ensure that
the sampling procedure does not affect the substantive con-
clusions, and this does not seem to be the case.
5 A natural extension of the model is to relax this assump-
tion and assume that actors know only behavior of actors
they are connected to, or that are within a given distance
in the network. First analyses of such extensions (to be
reported elsewhere), however, suggest that although assum-
ing limited information in itself has interesting effects, the
conclusions as reached in the current study are not under-
mined.
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both actors are indifferent between having
and not having a tie. One additional assump-
tion is needed here to handle actors who are
not connected to anyone at all. These actors
cannot adapt their behavior to any connected
actor; moreover, in some cases, they are not
able to connect to anyone else, regardless of
the behavior they choose, because the other
actors already have the optimal number of
ties. In such cases, the unconnected actor
changes behavior only if that might create
opportunities to become connected in the
next period. Otherwise, the actor does not
change behavior. Clearly, other rules for
changing behavior and relations can be con-
ceived. We have chosen some of the most
straightforward options on who might
change what and when. However, further
investigation into how the dynamics depend
on these options is called for only if out-
comes differ dramatically between them. As
we will see below, this is not the case.6
For each of the 13,59795,729
109,326 networks and each of the three
versions of the dynamics, we varied the
initial conditions in the following way. The
simulation was done four times with differ-
ent values of the quadratic cost component
for each version of the dynamic process and
for 13,597 networks of size up to 8. We dis-
tinguished only two levels of the quadratic
cost component for the 95,729 larger net-
works. One random choice was made to
select the other conditions. Then, each of the
initial conditions was repeated four times.
These repetitions with the same set of initial
conditions enable us to distinguish between
stochastic variation in the outcomes that is
related to variations in initial conditions and
randomness caused by the dynamic process.
At each repetition, we let the process con-
tinue until it converges. This leads to
13,597	4895,729	242,950,152
simulation runs.
To analyze the effects of the initial
network and to evaluate the emerging net-
works, we need to define and compute some
key network characteristics:
• Size represents the number of actors.
• Density is the number of existing ties
divided by size	 (size1)/2, size1the
possible number of ties in the network
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994: 101).
• Degree is the number of ties of an actor
divided by size1. This ‘relative’ definition
differs slightly from the more common
‘absolute’ definition (Wasserman & Faust,
1994: 100), but facilitates comparison
across network size.
• Centralization is measured through the
standard deviation of the degrees as
defined above. This measure is derived
directly from the variance in degrees as
proposed by Snijders (1981; see also
Wasserman & Faust, 1994: 101). Other
centralization measures (Freeman, 1979)
lead to similar results in the analyses that
we present below.
• Distance is a dyadic measure, the mini-
mum path length between two actors
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994: 110).
• Segmentation is the proportion of dyads at
distance larger or equal to 3 of all dyads at
distance larger or equal to 2 (Baerveldt &
Snijders, 1994). In accordance with
Baerveldt & Snijders, we count discon-
nected dyads as having a distance larger
than 3. In the complete network, there is
clearly no segmentation, which implies
that this measure is equal to 0.
• Segregation measures the extent to which
ties are limited to actors with the same
behavior, rather than between actors with
different behavior. It is defined as the
expected number of between-group ties
minus the observed number of between-
group ties, divided by the expected number
6 Additional simulations with simultaneous updating of
behavior (not reported here) also lead to similar results
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of between-group ties, assuming random
matching (Freeman, 1978). This is the
only measure that combines behavior and
network structure. Because there are no ties
between actors with the same behavior in
the emerging networks, this measure
always equals 1 for the emerging network.
• Number of components is the number of
connected subgraphs (including isolates)
that are not connected to the rest of the
network. If the number of ties actors can
have is low, owing to the high tie costs,
groups of actors that behave in the same
way might still fall apart into different
components.
Size, density, and centralization are
included because these represent the most basic
network measures: the number of actors, the
number of ties in the network, and the varia-
tion of ties between actors. The measures for
segregation, segmentation, and components
are included because they are particularly
relevant for group-formation processes in
general and polarization in particular. While
polarization indicates the extent to which
actors are divided into subgroups due to their
behavior, segmentation and components
indicate the extent to which actors are divided
into subgroups due to the network structure.
Segregation is a measure of the extent to
which behavioral and structural groupings
coincide. The other measures are described
only to define the network measures that we
need in the analyses below. We also record the
distribution of behavior in the initial and the
emerging networks, the number of tie
changes until convergence, and the number
of behavior changes until convergence.
Some parameter values among the initial
conditions are less interesting to analyze and
are difficult to compare with the large set of
cases. These are the following subsets:
• Cases for which 14. If 14, actors
who choose X cannot maintain any ties.
As a result, in over 80% of the cases, all
actors choose Y. Actors will stick to X only
if no one chooses Y or all Y-choosing
actors do not want to add ties.
• Cases that start in a situation in which
everyone chooses X or everyone chooses Y.
Behavior does not change in these cases,
and only the network ties are adapted until
the network is t¯X -full or t¯Y -full.
Excluding these cases, 1,544,100 cases
remain for the analyses. Summary statistics for
the initial conditions are shown in Table I.
Simulation Results
In this section, we explain properties of the
stable networks in terms of polarization and
efficiency by the model parameters, using
statistical regression analysis. Table II pre-
sents summary statistics for the stable states.
One result is that the relative number of
behavioral changes (number of changes per
actor) is considerably lower than the relative
number of network changes (number of
changes per dyad). This can be understood
by recognizing that changing one’s behavior
has much more impact than changing one
tie: in the case of a behavioral change, the pay-
offs resulting from all interactions are affected,
while changing a tie affects only one relation.
Therefore, an actor mostly does not change
behavior more than once. Usually actors
need to adapt multiple relationships to opti-
mize their situation.
The type of network dynamics does not
have a large influence on the stable networks.
In both ‘alternating’ and ‘fast network’
dynamics, there are somewhat more changes
in behavior and ties than in ‘actor-based’
dynamics. Surprisingly, the number of tie
changes is only marginally larger in ‘fast
network’ dynamics than in ‘alternating’
dynamics, although there are many more
opportunities to change ties in the former.
Because of the limited differences between
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the types of dynamics, we provide only joint
summary statistics in Table II.
Polarization is our first important depen-
dent variable. Recall that polarization is
defined as 4p(Y )(1p(Y )), where p(Y ) is
the proportion of actors choosing Y. In more
than 60% of the stable states, behavior is
homogeneous and, thus, without polariza-
tion. Efficiency, as expressed by the propor-
tion of actors choosing the Y-behavior, is a
little above 50%, which is only slightly higher
than the average efficiency in initial networks
(see Table I). The standard deviation of effi-
ciency in stable states is rather large, reflect-
ing the large proportion of homogeneous stable
states. These percentages are not easily inter-
preted, because they depend to a large extent
on our choice of initial conditions. Therefore,
we focus below on how polarization and effi-
ciency change with initial conditions.
Predicting Stable States I: Polarization
To examine how polarization depends on the
parameters of the simulation, we use linear
regression models, with polarization as the
dependent variable and the initial conditions
(the network structure, the initial distribu-
tion of behavior, the tie costs, and the
dynamics version) as independent variables.
It is important to realize that standard errors
reflect uncertainties due to the randomness
of the dynamic process and misspecification
of the model, not ‘sampling’. In addition,
with more than a million cases, even very
small effects are significant. Therefore, we
restrict ourselves to comparisons of relative
sizes of standard errors between variables to
provide information on the relative stability
of the effects, and we do not report significance
levels. Standard errors are adapted for cluster-
ing within initial conditions (Rogers, 1993).
Polarization in stable states has an
extremely skewed distribution, with over
60% of the stable networks showing homo-
geneous behavior where the value of polar-
ization is 0. Our statistical model has to take
this unusual distribution into account. We
decide to model polarization with two sepa-
rate analyses. First, we estimate a model pre-
dicting whether stable states are heterogeneous
or not, using logistic regression. Then, we
apply a linear regression model to predict the
extent of polarization in the cases with polar-
ization. The tie costs are included in the
analysis as the difference in the number of
ties an actor can have while choosing Y as
compared to the number of ties he can have
while choosing X divided by size. The effect
of tie costs is small, and only the quadratic
cost component turns out to be relevant for
predicting behavior in the analysis. This
component can be adequately summarized
by (t¯Yt¯X)/size. We add dummies for the dif-
ferent types of dynamics.
Because the outcomes of the analyses
strongly depend on initial polarization, we
Table I. Summary Statistics of Initial Conditions in the Simulation (N1,544,100)
Variable Mean SD Min. Max.
Size 24.506 13.757 2 50
Proportion actors playing Y 0.500 0.225 0.022 0.974
t¯X 12.279 10.487 1 49
t¯Y 18.282 13.407 1 49
Density 0.500 0.244 0 1
Centralization 0.238 0.130 0 0.873
Segregation 0.000 0.166 3 1
Segmentation 0.164 0.267 0 1
Number of components 1.541 2.582 1 42
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ran separate analyses for different categories
of initial polarization. These analyses sug-
gested adding interactions of initial polariza-
tion with density and segregation to our
model.7 To facilitate the interpretation of the
main effects, density is centered at the mean
before taking the interaction. Initial polariza-
tion and segregation already have a mean
equal to 0.
In Table III, we report the results sepa-
rately for high and low RISK, although the
models do not differ substantially between
RISK values, to facilitate comparison with
the results on efficiency reported below. The
initial distribution of behavior, operational-
ized as the polarization at the start of the
process, has a large positive effect on polar-
ization in stable networks. There is a slightly
higher probability of persisting polarization
for the ‘alternating’ version of the dynamics
compared to the ‘actor-based’, which is the
reference category. The probability of per-
sisting polarization is highest for the ‘fast
network’ version, which is understandable,
since many network changes result in a net-
work falling apart in groups with different
behaviors before actors have an opportunity
to adapt behavior. Substantively, this leads to
the plausible interpretation that in societies
in which relations are more volatile while
people tend to stick more strongly to their
behaviors or opinions, it is more likely that
persistent disagreement arises that may
induce conflicts. The difference between the
number of ties one wants to have choosing Y
compared to choosing X has a negative effect
on the probability of any polarization as well
as the extent of polarization. The probability
of persistent polarization and the extent of
polarization decrease for larger networks.
Considering the network effects, density
has a large negative effect on the probability
of any polarization as well as on the extent of
polarization (given positive polarization).
Segregation has a small positive effect on the
probability of any emerging polarization for
average initial polarization and a small nega-
tive effect on the extent of emerging polar-
ization. Segmentation increases the likelihood
of persistent polarization as well as the extent
of polarization. Centralization promotes the
probability of homogeneity, although if there
is some polarization, polarization will be
larger if initial centralization is higher.
As a result of the interaction of polarization
and density, the effect of density is stronger
for higher initial polarization. This implies that
density really helps to solve the polarization
problem, and if some disagreement persists,
at most a small minority will stick to the
‘deviant’ behavior, and will be excluded by
the majority. Although the main effect of seg-
regation is small, the interaction effect with
initial polarization is substantial. It shows
that segregation enhances polarization if the
Table II. Summary Statistics of Stable States (N1,544,100)
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Behavior changes per actor 0.250 0.161 0 4.897
Tie changes per dyad 0.492 0.191 0 2.333
Proportion actors playing Y 0.518 0.423 0 1
Polarization of behavior 0.271 0.387 0 1
Density 0.591 0.295 0.02 1
Segmentation 0.379 0.430 0 1
Centralization 0.158 0.185 0 0.873
Number of components 1.664 1.712 1 25
7 Similar series of analysis were done (e.g. for separate
values of network size), but these did not provide strong
evidence for the necessity to add interaction effects.
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initial network is rather polarized. Thus, if
differences in behavior are aligned with
initial group boundaries, the situation most
likely worsens as a result of network dynamics.
Predicting Stable States II: Efficiency
Efficiency has a somewhat peculiar distribu-
tion. In more than 60% of the stable states,
behavior is homogeneous (efficiency is 0 or 1),
while the remaining cases are more or less
evenly distributed between the two extremes,
such that the total distribution is U-shaped.
An appropriate way to analyze such a
dependent variable is logistic regression for
grouped data, which predicts the number of
successes (i.e. the number of actors choosing Y),
given the number of actors in the network.
As the sizes of some network effects depend
strongly on RISK, we conduct the analyses
separately for low RISK and high RISK
(Table IV).
The coefficients refer to the log-odds of
the predicted proportion. Clearly, the initial
proportion Y determines, to a large extent,
the emerging distribution of behavior. If the
group starts with a majority of actors choos-
ing Y, there is a large probability that an even
larger majority or the whole group will ulti-
mately choose Y. The other effects have to be
interpreted in terms of the extent to which
they affect this baseline dynamic. The ‘alter-
nating’ and ‘fast network’ dynamics have
higher rates of efficiency as compared to
‘actor-based’ dynamics for low RISK, while
Table III. Logistic and Linear Regression of Behavioral Polarization on Simulation Parameters with
Standard Errors Adapted for Clustering within Initial Condition
RISK0.467, c4 RISK0.538, c8
Probability of Extent of Probability of Extent of 
any polarization polarization any polarization polarization
initial condition Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err.
Polarization 5.739 (0.025) 0.820 (0.005) 6.500 (0.028) 0.926 (0.004)
Version 0.094 (0.008) 0.023 (0.001) 0.282 (0.008) 0.014 (0.001)
‘alternating’
Version ‘fast 0.601 (0.009) 0.023 (0.001) 0.801 (0.009) 0.015 (0.001)
network’
(¯tYt¯X)/size 0.383 (0.020) 0.013 (0.002) 0.419 (0.020) 0.030 (0.002)
Size 0.016 (0.000) 0.005 (0.000) 0.018 (0.000) 0.004 (0.000)
Density 4.166 (0.051) 0.003 (0.007) 4.500 (0.056) 0.083 (0.007)
Centralization 1.150 (0.041) 0.182 (0.005) 1.154 (0.041) 0.184 (0.005)
Segregation 0.301 (0.028) 0.083 (0.004) 0.258 (0.031) 0.074 (0.005)
Segmentation 0.636 (0.024) 0.047 (0.003) 0.680 (0.025) 0.037 (0.003)
Number of 0.134 (0.003) 0.004 (0.000) 0.147 (0.003) 0.005 (0.000)
components
Polarization	 0.402 (0.113) 0.516 (0.014) 0.292 (0.122) 0.389 (0.014)
Density
Polarization	 3.468 (0.091) 0.315 (0.012) 3.447 (0.098) 0.275 (0.012)
Segregation
Constant 3.096 (0.033) 0.037 (0.005) 3.666 (0.034) 0.019 (0.004)
Log-likelihood 360,165 353,668
(Pseudo) R2 0.283 0.394 0.305 0.425
Number of 767,946 277,578 776,154 282,468
observations
Variable in 
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this is the other way around for high RISK.
This can be interpreted in the following way.
Changes in behavior mostly have the largest
impact. Thus, if actors behave differently
from most actors they interact with, these
actors start changing behavior and thereafter
they optimize their ties. As we know from
models with static networks, adaptation of
behavior leads to attraction to the risk-dom-
inant equilibrium. In the ‘alternating’ and
‘fast network’ versions of the dynamics,
changing ties often has to be done before
behavioral changes. This apparently de-
creases the attraction to the risk-dominant
equilibrium. Except for the situation in
which no ties were possible between actors
choosing X, which are excluded from the
analysis, tie costs have only small effects.
Not only do the network effects vary
greatly with RISK, but some also vary with
the initial distribution of behavior. Therefore,
we consider again interaction effects between
the initial distribution of behavior and other
variables. Especially the density and central-
ization effects depend considerably on initial
behavior. In Table IV, interactions of the cen-
tered variables were included. In both
models, strong and positive interaction
effects exist between density and the initial
distribution of behavior, such that the effect
of density is negative for low initial propor-
tions and positive for high initial propor-
tions. For centralization and initial behavior,
the interaction effect points in the opposite
direction. The effects of density and central-
ization at their means are in different direc-
tions, and they also switch if one compares
high and low RISK. At the means, density
promotes efficiency for low RISK, but
hampers efficiency for high RISK. In con-
trast, centralization hampers efficiency under
low RISK, but promotes efficiency under
high RISK. It is important to realize that the
effects at the mean are relatively small com-
pared to the interaction effects. Segregation
has a negative effect on efficiency under low
RISK and a positive effect under high RISK.
This result indicates that segregation, to
some extent, is able to stabilize the more risky
equilibrium. Segmentation has a negative
Table IV. Logistic Regression for Grouped Data on the Proportion of Actors Choosing Y with
Standard Errors Adapted for Clustering within Initial Condition
RISK0.467, c4 RISK0.538, c8
initial condition Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err.
Proportion Y 16.728 (0.033) 16.778 (0.033)
Version ‘alternating’ 0.129 (0.006) 0.129 (0.006)
Version ‘fast network’ 0.107 (0.006) 0.023 (0.006)
(t¯Yt¯X)/size 0.189 (0.014) 0.357 (0.013)
Size 0.004 (0.000) -0.006 (0.000)
Density 1.479 (0.019) 1.414 (0.018)
Centralization 0.413 (0.032) 0.453 (0.030)
Segregation 0.281 (0.009) 0.134 (0.009)
Segmentation 0.058 (0.013) 0.182 (0.012)
Number of components 0.004 (0.000) 0.004 (0.000)
Prop. Y 	 Density 31.080 (0.120) 30.845 (0.122)
Prop. Y 	 Centralization 23.000 (0.143) 22.538 (0.144)
Constant 8.144 (0.026) 8.196 (0.025)
Log-likelihood 5,304,285 5,373,063
Number of observations 767,946 776,154
Variable in
087177_JPR_205-222.qxd  2/18/2008  10:37 AM  Page 218
 at University of Groningen on November 12, 2009 http://jpr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Vincent  Buskens  e t  a l . CO N S E N T O R CO N F L I C T 219
effect for low and high RISK. Network size
has only a small negative effect on efficiency.
To sum up, the strongest effect of the
initial network structure on efficiency is that
density galvanizes initial behavioral tenden-
cies. If we start at a rather high level of effi-
ciency, higher density leads to the emergence
of even more efficient networks. However, if
initial behavior is inefficient, the situation is
likely to worsen with dense networks. Other
network effects have a modest size. In the low-
risk situation, segregation prevents the ef-
ficient behavior for diffusion through the
whole network and therefore has a negative
effect on total efficiency. However, segrega-
tion helps to maintain efficient behavior in
parts of the network in the high-risk situa-
tion. On average, density decreases efficiency
in the high-risk situation, which is surpris-
ing because density increased efficiency in
high-risk situations for static networks (see
Buskens & Snijders, 2005). Centralization,
in contrast to density, favors minority behav-
ior in high-risk situations. An interpretation
for this would be that if this minority has a
central position in the network, they can
induce the majority to change their behavior.
Conclusions and Discussion
We develop a model explaining opinion-
formation or mass-mobilization processes as, for
example, occurred during the 2004 elections in
the Ukraine and the ‘Monday Demonstra-
tions’ in Leipzig, 1989–91. The model for-
malizes the coevolution of coordination and
networks to study under what conditions it
is more or less likely that the emergence of
stable states leads to inefficient situations or
situations with considerable conflict poten-
tial. We assume that actors are organized in
a specific network in which coordination
problems emerge. Initially, all actors behave
in a certain way (or have a certain opinion or
attitude toward a given issue). Depending on
their own behavior and the behavior of the
actors with whom they have relations, actors
change their behavior and their relation-
ships. After the network has developed into
a stable situation, we consider behavioral
polarization and efficiency in the emerged
stable situation.
It turns out that the initial network struc-
ture might affect the emerging distribution
of behavior. The most important result with
respect to polarization is that dense networks
lead to more homogeneous behavior, while
more segmented and segregated networks
have the opposite effect. The latter effect
becomes especially important if the initial
behavior is already polarized. If polarized
societies are indeed more prone to end up in
conflicts, conflicts are less likely in dense
cohesive societies, while conflicts are more
likely in segregated and segmented societies,
especially if the initial attitudes in sensitive
issues are correlated with initial groups in
social networks. The effect of centralization
is multifold: centralization of the initial
network increases the probability that all
actors behave in the same way, but if this is
not the case, centralization slightly promotes
the extent of polarization.
The most salient finding on efficiency is
that network density amplifies the effect of
the initial distribution of behavior. The
higher the density, the larger the effect of
initial inefficient behavior on the ineffi-
ciency of the emerging network. In addition,
if the initial behavior is equally distributed,
density still increases the likelihood that the
emerging behavior will be inefficient if the
efficient behavior is risky. A similar effect is
found for centralization, although smaller
and in the opposite direction: centralization
has a positive effect on efficiency if initial
efficiency is low and a negative effect if initial
efficiency is high. In addition, in larger, more
segmented, and more segregated networks,
behavior tends to become less efficient.
These results are consistent with the fact that
dictatorial states often survive for quite some
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time without having to cope with major
mass demonstrations (cf. Hardin, 1995). As
soon as a status quo with no major opposi-
tion is reached, it is difficult to turn this sit-
uation around. The centralization result
shows that the best opportunity to escape
from such an inefficient situation should
come from central people who can mobilize
others to start a revolt.
Although this article provides an extension
to existing models on network formation in
coordination problems and provides more
insight into the relation between initial con-
ditions and the emerging networks, there are
still a number of limitations. First, our model
assumes extreme opinion-formation problems,
in which people have a choice of only two
opinions and, if they do not agree, a relation-
ship would be very unattractive. In some of the
examples mentioned, such as the ones where
the choice is between standing up against the
regime or remaining quiet, these assumptions
are clearly more realistic than in less extreme
situations. Second, while coordination prob-
lems represent the evolution of norms or
opinions, many social interactions might lead
to conflicts of a different character. Such situ-
ations can also be related to, say, trust, cooper-
ation, or distribution problems (Heckathorn,
1996). Then, it becomes likely that actors dif-
ferentiate behavior between their partners.
People might trust some people and distrust
others. Therefore, the study of the evolution of
networks and the possible emergence of
related social problems can be extended to
other types of interactions in settings where
behavior coevolves with networks. In addition,
the theory developed has to be tested in experi-
mental and real-world settings to corroborate
the hypotheses developed in this article.
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